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In the 2001 Workshop the authors developed and applied a taxonomy and framework for 
assessing the status of agricultural and food policies in each of the NAFTA countries 
(Knutson, Loyns and Ochoa, 2002).  It divided the policies into the following areas: 
 
•  Facilitate growth and progress. 
•  Regulation. 
•  Market intervention. 
 
For each area the paper identified the major points of conflict that existed in 2001 
at the time the paper was written and the requirements for harmonization.  The major 
areas of conflict included: 
 
•  Facilitate growth and progress: particularly grades and standards in grains (US-
CA) and beef (US-CA); trade policy in dairy (US-CA), sugar (US-MX), poultry 
(US-MX), and wheat (US-CA); infrastructure policies (border conflicts US-MX). 
 
•  Regulation: particularly plant and animal protection (US-MX), food safety (US-
MX), pesticides (US-CA-MX). 
 
•  Market intervention: particularly disaster assistance (US-CA-MX), price supports 
and safety nets (US-CA-MX), and supply management and state trading. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to update that paper and to draw conclusions as to 
whether progress has been made since 2001 has been positive, negative, or neutral in 
each of these areas of conflict for policy/program convergence, harmonization, and 
compatibility.  The 2001 policies, therefore, can be looked upon as a policy baseline 
point of reference for comparison in 2003.  Many of the policy changes were embodied in 
and precipitated by the US 2002 farm bill.  However, care was taken to review each of 





The title of the 1996 Workshop included the terms harmonization, convergence, and 
compatibility.  Tim Josling defined each of the terms as follows: 
 
•  Harmonization:  The process of implementing uniform or essentially similar 
programs and/or regulations in each of the three NAFTA countries.   2 
•  Convergence:  The process of harmonizing programs/regulations over time.  The 
issue in convergence involves whether the countries are moving in direction of 
and harmonized policy, even though they have not gotten there. 
•  Compatibility:  The development of policies, programs, regulations, and 
instruments that are designed to be consistent with other countries or to bring 
about consistency.  Even though the policies, programs, regulations, or 
instruments may not be the same has the potential for conflict been reduced?  
 
  These definitions are important to evaluating the extent to which the objectives of 
free trade agreements (FTA) have been achieved.  A review of the previous eight 
workshop proceedings and related discussions indicates that different versions of these 
terms have been used with the potential for miscommunication and misunderstanding. 
Indeed, it is the conclusion of this paper only two of these three terms—compatibility and 
convergence—are crucial to determining extent to which the objectives of free trade 
agreements (FTA) have been achieved.   
 
  Josling’s definition of convergence--the issue of whether countries policies, rules 
and regulations are coming together over time--is acceptable from the perspective of this 
paper. 
 
  However, Josling’s definition that harmonization means developing uniform and 
essentially similar programs and/or regulations places too strict a requirements on and 
FTA.  While the requirement for uniformity has been expressed many times in workshops 
(see for example --sources--) and can be heard in almost any discussion of NAFTA, pro 
or con, this requirement may be unachievable.  It raises contentious and 
counterproductive questions of whose programs and regulations?  It implies that Mexico 
and Canada would have to adopt, for example, the U.S. model for their agriculture and 
food industries.  That outcome is highly unlikely.  Likewise, it is unlikely that United 
States would adopt the Mexican or Canadian models.  There are many resource, 
economic, political and cultural reasons why agricultural policy has evolved as it has in 
the three countries.  If free trade depends on evolution (convergence) to uniform and 
essentially similar programs and regulations, the required end result is a common 
agricultural and food program in the image of the European Union. 
   
  The proposition of this paper is that harmonization, as defined by Josling, is 
neither necessary for achieving the objective of free trade nor a requirement for 
evaluating the success of an FTA.  What is required is that programs, rules and 
regulations and business practices are compatible; if they are, free trade can occur and 
one can conclude that a workably harmonized trading environment has been achieved. 
Steve Meyer provided a wonderful metaphor to make this case at our fourth workshop. 
He said in effect “in our quartet it is my role to sing base; it is somebody else’s role to 
sing tenor. If we do it right there is fine harmony”.  For harmonized trading relations, 
laws, rules, regulations and trading/business conventions must be compatible.  It is this 
definition of harmonization that we use in this paper. And as we have pointed out many 
times, a very important antithesis of harmonized markets is trade disputes--the rationale 
for these workshops.   3 
 
What does this mean for harmonization/compatibility of policy?   
Policy is a guiding principle leading to a course of action or specific program that is 
pursued by the government.  Programs implement policy.  Policy influences or 
determines the actions and decisions of government regarding programs.  The pursuit of 
free trade in international markets is a policy.  An administration that embraces a free-
trade policy…actively pursues international actions that will reduce barriers to trade 
through its own programs and by negotiations with other countries….Agriculture and 
food policies embody the principles that guide government programs that influence:  
production; the resources utilized in production; domestic and international markets for 
commodities and food products; food consumption; and the conditions under which 
people live in rural America (Knutson, Penn, and Flinchbaugh). 
 
    Using this definition, policy is more likely to meet Joslings test for uniformity 
than the programs, rules and regulations that implement policy.  For example, one of the 
basic objectives of agricultural policy pursed by many countries is the maintenance of a 
safety net for farmers.  There are many different programs that can be specified as being 
consistent with this objective.  The only requirement imposed by this paper is that these 
programs be compatible and converging so that the holes in the safety net are 
approximately the same size.      
 
  In the 2002 workshop in the lead paper, Haddow (p. 4) indicated that this concept 
of harmonization already is applied in NAFTA committees and subcommittees: 
 
The whole point about this is that in a situation, say, between Canada and Mexico, Canada has a 
certain appropriate level of protection and we regulate in a certain manner with certain 
measures to achieve that appropriate particular level of protection. Let us also say that Mexico 
wants to export to Canada, but they do not regulate in exactly the same way that we do. Mexico 
may claim that it can achieve Canada’s appropriate level of protection but in a different way.  In 
this instance, Canada has a obligation to respond.  If it can be established that the way Mexico 
regulates, even though it is different, is able to achieve the appropriate level of protection at the 
end of the day, then the WTO Agreement encourages Canada to recognize that there is “more 
than one way to cook a steak” that is, there is more than one way to regulate in a particular area.  
 
  Further, in relation to labeling Haddow (p. 10) notes 
 
So the idea would be to set up some kind of common standard, or at least some kind of 
harmonized approach to that question. 
 
  It is clear from these comments that achieving compatibility is the focus with the 
same the policy objective.   
 
  It also is useful to define free trade.  While the 2001 paper avoided this question, 
this one does not. First and foremost, free trade is an economic concept to which 
Samuelson attached the theory of gains from trade.  It is also a concept based on 
competitive markets, differential resource endowments, and comparative advantage.  Free   4 
trade in this framework involves open borders, limited or no government intervention that 
distorts either resource allocation or trade, and individual countries and companies 
maximizing returns to resources according to their comparative advantage. The pay-off 
from economic activity and trade organized in this manner, which increasingly countries 
around the world have embraced, is one of maximizing social welfare provided there are 
no serious externalities. 
 
There are a number of implications of this is definition of free trade.  For 
example, differential institutional arrangements anywhere in the market place that limit or 
distort trade are not consistent with free trade such as incompatible labeling requirements, 
grade or health standards, quantitative restrictions, and exclusive pricing arrangements. 
Similarly, a difference in programs, rules, or regulations that distorts resource allocation 
among different groups within that country, and among countries, does not constitute free 
trade.  
 
  An open border appears to be a necessary condition for free trade, but it is not a 
sufficient condition.  Sumner (2002) appears to present a contrary argument by stating 
that in the world of trade-offs between trade negotiation and trade disputes, gains to 
exporters can be achieved even if fully coupled subsidies exist for domestic producers. 
He argues as well that there are real costs to using the WTO to attempt to preclude 
domestic support to agriculture. On another occasion in discussing these results in an 
open forum, he indicated that he was not clear on how open borders alone did not 
constitute free trade (2001). A close cousin of this position is that presented by Tolman 
(2002) when he argued that the grain subsidies in the United States have little to do with 
free trade because they are domestic subsidies, not export subsidies. A Canadian version 
of free trade involves the contention that wheat imports from the United States are 
commercially open because there are government documents that say that.  However, 
regulations and constraints prevent the free movement of wheat into Canada compared 
with corn, soybeans and soybean meal.  Being freely traded in the sense that some 
movement occurs is not necessarily free trade. 
 
  Jabara and Reeder state (2002) that CUSTA (the 1989 Canada/U.S component of 
the NAFTA) was never intended to accomplish free trade.  Instead, it was more of a 
customs union to achieve less regulated and less taxed cross-border trade.  Significant 
elements of their former programs, rules, and regulations were left intact by both 
countries. These conditions were not materially different in the 1995 U.S.-Mexico 
agreement and the Mexico-Canada agreement as components of NAFTA.  Consequently, 
there were many institutional constraints left in place to prevent a genuine free trade area. 
 
 
Aggregate Level of Intervention: 1995-2001 
 
Producer subsidy equivalents (PSEs) have their limitations in terms of analytic 
and descriptive content. However they have a degree of general acceptance for policy 
analysis purposes and they are centrally calculated according to common procedural 
guidelines. For our purposes, they provide a starting point for comparing the level and   5 
distribution of public intervention and support in the three NAFTA countries. The most 
significant limitation for this paper is that the available series ends in 2001 and, therefore, 
does not measure the impacts of the U.S. 2002 Farm Bill and comparable policy/program 
actions in Canada and Mexico.  While the amount of support/intervention is the driving 
force for changes in PSEs, the significant increase in grain and oilseed prices over part of 
the 2002-2003 period would, ceteris paribus reduce all measured support for those crops. 
In any event, we present and briefly interpret PSEs in the larger framework of this paper.    
   
Table 1 provides a summary comparison of the aggregate PSEs for the NAFTA 
countries covering the period 1995-2001.  It suggests relatively small PSE differences 
with the aggregate measures of support/intervention being in the range of 17-22 percent 
in 2000 and 2001.
1 
 
Table 1. Canada, U.S. and Mexico PSE, 1995-2001 
    1995    1996    1997    1998    1999    2000    2001 
Canada  19  16  14  17  18  19  17 
Mexico  -5  5  14  14  15  19  19 
United States  11  14  14  23  25  22  21 
 
As usual, the devil is in the detail.  Except for Canada, Table 2 indicates the 
evolution of a higher level of support/intervention, particularly in the field crops—a trend 
that might be anticipated to have continued through the 2003, led by the provisions of the 
U.S. 2002 Farm Bill.  Table 2 indicates generally higher levels of subsidies for major 
grains in the United States than in Canada since 1998.  However, these data indicate 
Mexico has also increased support for the sector, to an aggregate level not far behind the 
United States.  Support for milk has been comparable across the three NAFTA countries.  
Overall, Canadian support over this period has tended to be flat proportionate and the 
lowest of the three countries. 
 
Obviously there are major differences in priorities, policies and programs to 
produce these differences in commodity PSEs among the three NAFTA countries.  If a 
condition of harmonization is the convergence of the PSEs, at least within sectors 
between countries, this test is far from being met.  
 
Overview of Policy/Program Changes 
 
For each of the NAFTA countries, the purpose of this section is to provide a summary of 
major policy developments in agriculture since the 2001 baseline paper was written. 
 
United States 
While the 1996 farm bill was heralded as a watershed move toward less US government 
involvement in agriculture, the 2002 farm bill can be looked upon in varying degrees as a 
reversion to pre-1996 policies.  This happened more as a result of the convergence of 
                                                 
1 The devaluation of the peso in 1995 resulted in PSEs falling to less than zero.   6 
political forces in a struggle for control of the Congress than of Bush Administration 
policy.
2  The 2002 bill covers crop years 2002 through 2007. 
 
Table 2. Canada, U.S. and Mexico PSE by product, 1995-2001 
Product\Year  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001 
               
Canada               
Wheat  17  16  7  9  11  14  18 
Maize  4  5  6  8  14  24  16 
Milk  47  46  53  59  57  55  50 
Beef and Veal  8  6  6  8  8  9  8 
Pigmeat  9  7  5  7  11  8  6 
Poultry  5  6  7  4  2  2  3 
Eggs  30  21  25  19  19  21  18 
Other Grains  13  14  7  6  7  13  13 
Oilseeds  11  9  6  8  9  15  20 
               
United States               
Wheat  15  22  25  38  50  48  40 
Maize  6  12  14  28  34  33  26 
Rice  26  9  10  15  37  40  47 
Sugar  39  39  41  53  68  50  48 
Milk  35  44  45  61  56  45  51 
Beef and Veal  3  3  3  3  4  4  5 
Pigmeat  3  3  3  5  4  4  4 
Poultry  4  3  3  4  4  4  4 
Eggs  12  4  3  4  4  4  4 
Other Grains  8  20  23  42  45  45  36 
Oilseeds  5  5  5  15  24  27  25 
Sheepmeat  4  4  4  5  16  16  15 
Wool  38  3  3  4  5  5  5 
               
Mexico               
Wheat  -5  22  15  30  34  37  44 
Maize  28  7  30  32  39  47  50 
Rice  18  21  3  6  25  35  32 
Sugar  -1  36  34  39  57  54  45 
Milk  -1  23  35  42  43  41  44 
                                                 
2 It is important to realize that in the United States the Congress drives the policy direction through the 
provisions of the farm bill.  While the President has veto power, he is driven by the same set of political 
forces, albeit not as directly.  At the time the 2002 farm bill was debated the Senate was controlled 
Democrats and the House by the Democrats.  There was an election struggle developing for control of the 
Congress.  Arguably, this struggle had more to do with the generous outcome of the bill than did economic 
conditions in agriculture.  The policy of the Bush administration, particularly as revealed in the Doha 
Round of WTO negotiations is little changed from that espoused leading up to the URAA and for that 
matter embodied in the URAA (see for example, Penn, 2002 and USDA, 2001).  One of the important 
lessoned learned from the Workshops is that differences in the structure of government among the NAFTA 
countries has a substantial impact on the power of the executive branch to impose its will on the legislative 
branch.  In this sense Mexico and the United States are more similar than Canada, where the parliamentary 
system gives the same party control over both the legislative and executive functions—if the majority party 
has its act together.   7 
Beef and Veal  -25  12  24  19  9  10  7 
Pigmeat  -28  -11  -3  4  14  4  9 
Poultry  -20  -2  9  -2  -11  0  -8 
Eggs  -20  -12  -16  -32  -44  -33  -23 
Other Grains  27  13  22  23  34  35  30 
Oilseeds  16  21  13  26  48  41  54 
OECD data supplied by Aleksandar Jotanovic, Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada, 27-Mar-03 
   
 
The reversion to pre-1996 policies reinstated the target price, arguably in 
decoupled form and without reinstatement of production control authority.
3  The 
argument over whether the new target price payments falls in the amber box centers 
around whether allowing farmers to update their program base and yields constitutes 
coupling even though a farmer does not have to grow the crop to be eligible for a 
deficiency payment (now referred to as a counter-cyclical payment.  In addition to the 
target price, the 2002 farm bill retains the original decoupled fixed payments (in political 
vernacular referred to as market loss payments), but institutionalized the level of 
payments to include the supplemental payments that were added annually to level 
authorized in the 1996 bill.  It also retained the marketing loan, which following the 
enactment of the 1996 bill was applied to all program commodities.  Loan rates, from 
which loan deficiency payments are calculated based on current yields, were increased by 
somewhat variable percentages across commodities.  For example, the wheat loan rate 
was increased from $2.58/bu. in 2001 to $2.80 in 2002-03, then to $2.75 in 2004-07. 
 
The 2002 bill also expanded commodity coverage for one or more of these income 
support programs (Table 3).  
 
The U.S. crop insurance program has become an important source of income 
support for producers located in high-risk areas (Tweeten).  Under WTO the yield 
coverage is more than 70 percent and if the payout for losses (indemnities) of a crop 
insurance program is greater than the producer premiums, the difference will not qualify 
for green box status.  There were no crop insurance changes made since 2001. However, 
the Congress continues to undermine the remaining economic rationality of this program 
by providing disaster payments to farmers who do not buy a sufficient level of coverage. 
   
As a general rule, the economic impacts of these changes in farm program 
provisions are to increase production and lower prices.  The amount of increase in 
production and price reduction varies by program and by commodity (Tweeten, 2002).  
In the short run, livestock producers benefit in terms of lower feed costs and, in the long 
run, from increased consumption due to lower meat, egg, and milk prices. 
 
                                                 
3 Prior to the 1996 farm bill, target price deficiency payments were paid on farmers’ historical base acres 
when the annual average market price of wheat fell below the target price.  Frequently, to be eligible for 
deficiency payments farmers were required to set aside a percentage of the base acres, which put these 
payments in WTO’s blue box.   8 
The 2002 Farm Bill added a requirement for country of origin labeling of meats, 
fish, produce, and peanuts by 2004, which is the subject of a separate paper in this 
workshop. 
 
Table 3.  Commodities and program coverage added in 2002 farm bill. 
Commodity  Fixed payment  Target Price  Marketing loan 
Milk  Na  .45($16.94-$BosCI)  na 
Wool and mohair  Na  $1.00/lb. wool,  
$4.20/lb. mohair 
na 
Soybeans  $0.44/bu.  $5.80/bu.  Reduced $5.26/bu 
to $5.00/bu 









Flaxseed  Na  na  $0.0698/lb. 
Canola  Na  na  $0.0949/lb. 
Rapeseed  Na  na  $0.0947/lb. 
Safflower seed  Na  na  $0.1253/lb. 
Mustard seed  Na  na  $0.0988/lb. 
Small chickpeas  Na  na  $0.0756/lb. 
Lentils  Na  na  $0.1194/lb. 
Dry peas  Na  na  $0.0633/lb. 
 
Several, presumable WTO green box, farmer payments were authorized for 
conservation practices, environmental controls for livestock and poultry farms, wildlife 
habitat.  In addition, green box acreage increases were authorized for the conservation 




While Canadian farmers have advocated increased government support in reaction to the 
U.S. 2002 farm bill, changes in policy have been modest at both federal and provincial 
levels.  This lack of responsiveness has been tempered by grain and oilseed price 
increases due to weather adversities.  Favorable production conditions in 2003 with a 
resulting decline in world market prices could rejuvenate Canadian farmers’ demands for 
additional support. 
 
The essence and philosophy of Canadian agricultural and food policy at present 
can be summarized from statements made to a prairie commodity group in a letter from 
the federal Minister of Agriculture Van Clief  (January 30, 2003). The statements were 
made in the context of the request by the producer group for consideration to a more 
balanced playing field for Canadian grains and oilseeds: The Minister made the following 
points, which are paraphrased for purposes of this paper:  
   9 
•  We need to ask ourselves whether higher subsidies make the agricultural sector in 
the United States and EU more competitive over the long run, or whether they 
create sectors more dependent on subsidies: 
•  Australia, Argentina and Brazil, important players in global competition, 
  are increasing their market shares, and are low subsidy countries. 
•  Canada needs a different approach to build a stronger, more profitable agriculture 
sector, and to avoid the mistakes of the United States, which includes ‘farming the 
mailbox’. 
•  The objective in Canada has been to support in ways that help farmers deal with 
income problems by sharing with the provinces in spending on research and 
development and by providing safety nets like the Net Income Stabilization 
Account program (NISA).        
•  The Government of Canada will examine the U.S. FSRI Act (2002 Farm Bill) to 
determine how Canadian interests can be pursued and our rights protected.  It will 
continue policy and economic analysis of the implementation of the U.S. FSRI 
Act (2002 Farm Bill) and remind U.S. officials that they need to lead by example 
if WTO negotiations on agriculture are to be successful. High subsidies will 
distort markets and compromise U.S. credibility at WTO. 
•  Canada is committed to using WTO to reduce trade-and production distorting 
subsidies. Canada is committed to the Cairns Group to pursue lower U.S. and EU 
subsidies.   
•  A commitment of $5.2 B over 5 years is made to strengthen Canadian agriculture, 
$175 million of which will be used to strengthen presence in key markets. 
•  We recognize grain producers for their leadership in meeting consumer demands 
for safe, high-quality, environmentally friendly food. 
•  We will ensure that the resources of the federal and provincial governments are 
used to facilitate business and the shift toward value-added opportunities. 
•  Canada, as an exporting nation, will take no action that would result in 
countervail actions by its trading partners. 
•  Canada favors the approach that combines risk management and income 
stabilization into an agricultural income safety net package. 
  
  The focal point for safety net support is the Net Income Stabilization Account 
(NISA).  This program continues to evolve as disaster programs, such as the Canadian 
Farm Income Program (CFIP) is phased into NISA.  NISA is a voluntary program 
whereby the government matches farmers’ tax-deferred contributions that may be 
withdrawn in low-income years.    
 
Mexico 
For the first time in Mexico’s modern history, a different political party (PAN) has been 
in charge of the Executive Branch, under the leadership of President Fox. While 
Congress is much more diverse, it is still dominated by the previous ruling party (PRI).  
The change in the presidential helm resulted in a suddenly spirited Congress fueled by a 
broader political spectrum.  The result has created a politically charged environment in 
the Mexico with the unprecedented need of interaction of an inexperienced 
administration and an energetic Congress.  The benefit of the political struggle has been a   10 
more balanced approach potentially leading to a longer-term design for Mexican 
agricultural policy.  The result has been initiatives, such as the Law of Sustainable Rural 
Development, that truly supports the administration programs.  In addition, the Sector 
Development Program for Crops, Livestock, Rural Development, Fisheries, and Nutrition 
2001-2006, provides a serious analysis of the situation and a roadmap for future 
government programs in agriculture.   
 
In spite of such forwards looking steps, Mexican agricultural policy seems to be a 
counterbalanced reaction to the U.S. farm policy.  The 2002 U.S. Farm Bill did not 
provide any relief to the already politically hot environment in Mexico.  Doing away with 
the freer market rationale of the U.S. 1996 Farm Bill, which really began in 1998, created 
turmoil in the Mexican agricultural sector.  In addition, the mid-term elections coming in 
2003 have created the conditions for certain political interests to influence public opinion 
on the benefits and maladies of NAFTA within the Mexican agricultural sector.  These 
groups are requesting the administration to: 
  
•  Renegotiate the agricultural chapter of NAFTA, at least for corn and edible beans. 
•  Establish timely, multi-year support for agriculture. 
•  Create an emergency fund for agriculture. 
•  Give amnesty on loan default for agricultural producers. 
 
The Mexican government publicized an Agrifood Armored-Plate Program 
(Programa de Blindaje Agropecuario) in an effort to counterbalance the provisions and 
advantages that the 2002 Farm Bill provides to the producers in the United States.  This 
program contemplated provisions to effectively deal with trade disputes, harmonize 
regulations and standards, provide multi-year income support for grain and oilseeds, and 
provide farmer subsidies for energy (Rosenzweig, 2003).  In reality, because of a late 
reaction, lack of definition and lack of additional funds, to the public it seemed like a 
desperate move by the administration to buy time and to appease increasingly vocal 
political adversaries. 
 
Mexican farm programs continue to have a strong social component emphasizing 
support for small-holding and subsistence agriculture.  The following are some of the 
main reasons for these policies (SAGARPA, 2001b; 2002): 
 
•  Approximately 25 percent of the Mexican population lives in rural areas. 
•  The size of traditional agricultural plots in this segment of the populations is very 
small with 60 percent of the production units being less than 5 ha (12.4 ac) and 30 
percent smaller than 2 ha (5 ac).  In terms of scale and productivity, this is 
insufficient for a family to live in any decent conditions thus creating strong 
incentives for migration and abandonment of land. 
•  A large segment of the population is made up of indigenous producers in very 
marginal production areas. 
 
Modifications of the Mexican farm program have been suggested to accommodate 
producers with land tenure smaller that 1 ha (0.5 ac).  Although these programs are   11 
externally evaluated (FAO-SAGARPA, 2003), there is still a need for monitoring 
mechanisms that allow assessment of the benefits as well as the beneficiaries of these 
programs and a direct linkage to the policy makers.  This would give policy makers the 
opportunity to tailor future programs or to modify existing programs to fit the needs of 
specific segments of the population. 
 
One of the main drawbacks of the Mexican policy making process is the lack of a 
strong analytical support system that would analyze the impacts of policy options and aid 
in designing long-term plans for the sector.  This lack of analyses, based on an 
objectively developed economic outlook/baseline hinders the implementation of multi-
year programs that could provide the much-needed certainty to agricultural producers in 
their operations.  Without the sound economic analyses, the legislative process gets 
blindsided to the potential long-term negative impacts of naive policy proposals and 
actions.  For example, in 2003, import tariffs for poultry were scheduled to be phased 
down to zero from 260 percent, while the tariffs for pork were to drop from 20 percent to 
0.  Clear economic signals indicating the development of a strong vertically-integrated 
and internationally-coordinated poultry industry made possible an agreement to extend 
the phase-out period, but yet encourage continued adjustment to change.  In contrast, the 
hog industry, with equal potential, is set to utilize antidumping and countervailing duty 
measures to shield sector producers from pork product imports.  
 
Rosenzweig (2003) presents a detailed report on Mexican policy changes during 
the 2001-2003 period.  Direct payments (PROCAMPO), marketing support (ASERCA), 
and the Alliance for Agriculture (Alianza para el Campo) make up the bulk of the budget 
for the Mexican agricultural programs.  The Fox administration has gradually increased 
the level of subsidies across all three programs to compensate for the 1994-95 crisis.   
 
PROCAMPO, the most socially oriented program will account for more than one-
third of the expenditures (Table 4).  About 2.8 million producers benefited from this 
program in 2002.  More than 85 percent of the beneficiaries were very smallholders, 
which in many instances only harvest crops for subsistence.   
 
Table 4. Direct payment program - PROCAMPO 
Item  1999  2000  2001/
e  2002/
 p 
Total Budget  US$ M*  937.2  1,037.9  1,100.5  1,242.0 
Payment / hectare 
  Fall/Winter 













Producers benefited (000) 
   Ejido system 
   Small producers 

















Source: Presidencia de la Republica, 2002 
*Rough conversion of $MX10:US$1 
   12 
The marketing support program continues providing support for specific 
agricultural activities (Table 5).  The crops protected under this program are rice, wheat, 
sorghum, corn, soybeans, safflower, cotton, peanuts, barley, and canola.  This program 
was originally designed to provide support for producers to pay for marketing expenses, 
such as storage and transportation. It was directed mainly to provide a relief to those 
highly producing areas, located far from the centers of consumption.  In its original form, 
this subsidy was widely criticized for the distortions it caused in the production patterns 
and the inequitable distribution of resources among relatively few producers.  The newly 
approved changes portend a more rational and widespread application of this subsidy for 
agricultural producers. 
 
Table 5. Marketing payments and regional market development programs (US$ M*) 
Item  1999  2000  2001/
e  2002/
 p** 
Rice  4.2  6.9  12.7  9.2 
Wheat  83.1  76.6  95.1  140.0 
Sorghum  20.1  12.3  70.1  29.9 
Corn  36.8  82.5  201.8  177.2 
Soybean      5.1   
Safflower      5.5  4.9 
Cotton  13.1    25.8  20.7 
Peanuts      0.4   
Barley      1.4  0.4 
Canola      1.1   
Other market development    114.4  94.0   
Complementary support        51.0 
Source: Presidencia de la Republica, 2002 
*Rough conversion of $MX10:US$1 
**Rosenweig, 2003 
 
The Alliance for Agriculture is a series of programs that include support for crops, 
livestock, rural development, irrigation, promotion and information systems and crop and 
animal protection (sanitary and phytosanitary) (Table 6).  Their main objective is to 
promote investment, encourage technology transfer, develop market awareness, foster 
compliance with animal and plant protection regulations, and generally support the 
rehabilitation of the infrastructure.  This program is supported by both federal and state 
funds.  The contribution of the states is variable, but reaches up to half of the federal 
appropriations.  These cost-sharing programs require a contribution from the producers to 
be eligible for their benefits.  Every program varies in its level of support, but the 
importance of these programs resides in the multiplier effect that is achieved from 
increased investment in agriculture.  The cost-sharing contributions from the producers 
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Table 6. Support for Mexican Agriculture under the Alianza para el Campo (Alliance for 
Agriculture) Program (US$ M*) 
1999  2000  2001/
e  2002/
 p  Item 
Federal  State  Federal  State  Federal  State  Federal  State 
Crops  83.9  56.2  57.9  49.1  122.5  55.8  120.5  40.7 
Livestock  40.4  25.8  38.4  26.9  46.2  30.7  79.5  31.1 
Info and 
Promotion 
3.2  6.9  2.9  8.3  4.9  3.1  8.9  3.2 
Rural 
development 
102.1  43.0  148.0  43.1  202.8  56.1  426.7  54.8 
Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary 
20.2  14.3  22.0  15.1  28.2  23.5  24.1  26.9 










































Source: Presidencia de la Republica, 2002 
*Rough conversion of $MX10:US$1 
 
Private investment in agriculture has been hindered by the high cost of money (up 
to three times the level in the U.S.).  Agricultural lending has been scarce and expensive.     
Private banks consider agriculture an expensive portfolio and a very high-risk investment.  
For this reason, the benefits of the lending and investment programs have been marginal.    
 
FIRA-Bank of Mexico, the government development bank that operates credit 
guarantees and discounts through private banks, severely diminished its operations in the 
late 1990s.  The development of diverse mechanisms and simplification of the processes 
is a genuine effort to improve the level of lending in agriculture.  However, the adverse 
economic conditions in the country have discouraged significant levels of investment in 
the sector. (SAGARPA, 2002) 
 
Due to inefficiency and poor management, on of the main agricultural lending 
arms of the government, Rural Bank or BANRURAL, severely scaled down its 
agricultural operations from 1.5 million producer/customers in 1982 to only 235,000 in 
2000 (SAGARPA, 2002).  As a result, the Fox administration has decided to terminate 
BANRURAL and to replace it with a new agricultural lending institution with different 
lending mechanisms, revamped technical support and improved customer service. 
 
Private agricultural insurance has been discouraged by high administrative costs. 
Government agricultural insurance programs are operated by AGROASEMEX, the 
government insurance agency.  The program includes a subsidy to insurance premiums 
for crops according to the activity and the region in the country.  For livestock, the   14 
subsidy covers up to 30 percent of the insurance premium, with limits on a per-head basis 
(SAGARPA, 2000a).  
 
 
Evaluation for Major Conflict Areas 
 
The following evaluation is designed to indicate based on the above explanation whether 
government program developments have been converging since the 2001 baseline 




Facilitate Growth and Progress 
Mexico:  If effectively implemented, the Alliance for Agriculture program holds 
substantial potential for closing the large infrastructure gap identified in research, 
extension, irrigation, and technology.  In addition, improvements in credit availability 
and service for agriculture hold the potential for convergence in the availability of credit. 
In contrast, increased use and threat of use of antidumping, countervailing duty, and 
licensing measures have been counterproductive in fostering adjustment and improved 
trading relationships. 
 
United States:  The inclusion of Cool provision in the 2002 Farm Bill was a sizable step 
backward in trading relations with both Canada and Mexico.  Substantial barriers to trade 
in sugar and dairy remain. 
 
Canada:  The major areas of conflict involving barriers to trade resulting from state 
trading, grading procedures, and supply management programs remain.  Pressures to 
eliminate single desk selling appear to have subsided from both a U.S. and Canadian 
interest group perspective. 
 
Regulation 
United States:  Continued pursuit of confined animal feeding (CAFO) regulations by the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) holds the potential for widening the disparity in 
regulation and its related costs, particularly with Mexico. 
 
Mexico:  Pursuit of the application of animal and plant health procedures and Hazard 
Analysis Critical Control Point (HACCP) training in cooperation with the United States 
is closing the gap in regulations affecting trade. 
 
Canada:  No significant new areas of conflict. 
 
Market Intervention 
United States:  The reinstatement of the target price in the U.S. 2002 Farm Bill and the 
expansion of its provisions to an enlarged set of commodities was a major step backward 
in pursing convergence of policies under NAFTA. 
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Mexico:  Mexico has attempted to match U.S. levels of support and to prevent spillover 
effects on the hog industry. 
   
Canada:  With relatively favorable grain prices, Canada appears to be pursuing a wait-
and-see strategy regarding the effects of the 2002 Farm Bill on its farmers and 
agricultural economy.  The Net Income Stabilization Account (NISA) continues to be the 
focal point for safety net support of the broad spectrum of Canadian farmers who choose 
to utilize it.  Supply management programs continue to dominate the dairy and poultry 
industries.  Unspecified standby support may materialize if world price conditions 





Government program convergence is the key to the resolution of trade disputes, which 
leads to the integration of markets.  Convergence requires commonality of policy –the 
same set of guiding principles for program development across the three NAFTA 
countries.  With such a common understanding, government programs that foster trade 
disputes can be avoided.  The result will be the integration of markets.  This requires 
communication among policy makers and analysts regarding commonalities of policy 
goals and an understanding of program impacts prior to their adoption. 
 
One has to look hard to find examples of converging government programs under 
NAFTA since 2001.  Those that have been identified result, in part, from increased 
country-to-country cooperation, such as that occurring between the United States and 
Mexico in infrastructure development.  If nothing else, the U.S. 2002 Farm Bill 
experience may have sensitized its legislators to the need to consider the impacts of 
policy and program changes on its trading partners. 
 
Absent the adoption of new institutional arrangements for aggressively pursuing 
policy convergence, such as discussed in the 2002 workshop, substantial progress in 
convergence of policies under NAFTA would appear to depend upon multinational 
agreements within World Trade Organization (WTO) Doha Round and its sequels.  U.S. 
proposals to increase market access, reduce domestic support, and eliminate the WTO 
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